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ABSTRACT 
In recent years, the Russian government has promoted patriotism as a means to unify society and 
secure the legitimacy of Putin’s regime. This paper considers the effectiveness of this campaign 
by examining everyday understandings of patriotism among Russian citizens. Drawing on in-
depth interviews and focus groups conducted in two regions in 2014-2015, patriotism is lived and 
experienced among ordinary Russians as a personal, normative, and apolitical ideal that diverges 
significantly from official patriotic narratives. At the same time, Russians are convinced that the 
majority of fellow citizens are patriotic in the ways envisioned by the government. As a result, the 
government’s use of patriotism is more effective in raising barriers to collective action than 
cultivating legitimacy. At the same time, everyday forms of patriotism encourage citizens to 
sacrifice public choice and to tolerate authoritarian rule.  
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1 An initial draft of this paper was presented at the 46th Annual Convention of the Association for Slavic, 
East European & Eurasian Studies, San Antonio, November 20-23, 2014. My thanks to fellow conference 
participants for helpful feedback.  
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INTRODUCTION 
On the Urals website znak.com, a surprising survey appeared in early August 2014: “what is more 
important to you, Crimea or cheese?” The survey was surprising in part because of the patriotic 
wave engulfing Russia, in which questioning the annexation of Crimea became subject to criminal 
penalty.2 Yet even more surprising was that 67% chose cheese over Crimea (see FIGURE 1) at a 
time when the government and media loudly and insistently claimed that Western sanctions 
would have little impact on daily life.3 While it is tempting to view such a poll as provocation in 
pitting patriotic sentiment against dairy products, at a minimum it raises an intriguing question: 
what kind of patriotism is consistent with Russians claiming cheese is more important than 
Crimea?  
The answer has potentially far reaching implications for understanding how 
authoritarianism ‘works’ in Russia and more generally among ordinary citizens in authoritarian 
states. Much of the comparative literature on the ‘new authoritarianism’ focuses on a mix of elite 
competition and cohesiveness, material or status incentives, and coercion to explain the 
trajectories of authoritarian rule. Focusing on elites makes sense in relation to the distribution of 
patronage, use of coercion, or the manipulation of formally democratic institutions.4 As 
                                                            
2 Maria Makutina, “Srok vozvrata: Za prizyvy vernut’ Krym Ukraine s 9 maia budet lishit’sia svobody 
srokom do piati let,” Gazeta RBK, March 24, 2014, 
http://www.rbc.ru/newspaper/2014/03/24/56bf1e9f9a7947299f72d389. 
3 The poll was soon taken down from the site, by which time it reached nearly 15,000 responses.  
4 Larry Diamond, “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes,” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (2002): 21–35; Henry E. 
Hale, Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014); Jennifer Gandhi, Political Institutions under Dictatorship (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2010); Stephen Levitsky and Lucan Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Beatriz Magaloni, Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and 
Its Demise in Mexico (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Andreas Schedler, The Politics of 
Uncertainty: Sustaining and Subverting Electoral Authoritarianism (Oxford University Press, 2013); Milan W. 
Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule (Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
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authoritarian regimes proved increasingly durable in the post-Cold War era, scholars began to 
turn to ideational sources of power (like nationalism) and legitimation to account for regime 
dynamics and endurance.5  
Yet a crucial factor missing from such explanations is the people as the ultimate source 
of legitimacy. After all, even personalist autocracies make some claim to adhere to democratic 
practices and values for domestic consumption. In the post-Soviet sphere, Soviet-era tropes 
concerning patriotism, nationalism, and internationalism remain active and meaningful in public 
policy and electoral politics. With particular regard to Russia, Marlene Laruelle and others have 
written extensively on the convergence of regime, parties, and opposition on nationalist politics 
under the guise of patriotism.6 When nationalism becomes state policy, incumbents claim 
legitimacy by regulating the content, directionality, and participation of subordinates and 
opposition in nationalist politics.7 Indeed, a crucial means by which the Kremlin controls 
                                                            
5 For example: Steven R. Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, “Beyond Patronage: Violent Struggle, Ruling Party 
Cohesion, and Authoritarian Durability,” Perspectives on Politics 10, no. 4 (2012): 869–89, 
doi:10.1017/S1537592712002861; Calvert W. Jones, “Seeing Like an Autocrat: Liberal Social Engineering 
in an Illiberal State,” Perspectives on Politics 13, no. 1 (March 2015): 24–41, doi:10.1017/S1537592714003119. 
6 Marlene Laruelle, In the Name of the Nation: Nationalism and Politics in Contemporary Russia (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Marlene Laruelle, ed., Russian Nationalism and the National Reassertion of Russia, 
Reprint edition (S.l.: Routledge, 2009); Nicu Popescu, “The Strange Alliance of Democrats and 
Nationalists,” Journal of Democracy 23 (2012): 46–54; Natal ’ia Iudina, Vera Al’perovich, and Aleksandr 
Verkhovskii, “Mezhdu Manezhnoi i Bolotnoi: Ksenofobiia i radikal’nyi natsionalizm i protivodeistvie im v 
2011 godu v Rossii [Between Manezh and Bolotnaya: Xenophobia, radical nationalism, and efforts to 
counteract them in 2011]” (SOVA Informatsionno-analiticheskii tsentr, February 24, 2012), 
http://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/publications/2012/02/d23739/; Pål Kolstø, “The 
Ethnification of Russian Nationalism,” in The New Russian Nationalism: Imperialism, Ethnicity and 
Authoritarianism 2000-2015, ed. Pål Kolstø and Helge Blakkisrud (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2016), 18–45.  
7 J. Paul Goode, “Nationalism in Quiet Times: Ideational Power and Post-Soviet Electoral 
Authoritarianism,” Problems of Post-Communism 59 (2012): 6–16. 
3 
 
ideational capital in today’s Russia is by claiming state policy as patriotic while labeling opposition 
and extremists, alike, as nationalists.  
However, invoking patriotism as a means of legitimation is not without risk. First, while 
the government seeks to define and regulate the ways that patriotism is articulated and practiced, 
the concept is encumbered with Soviet-era associations as well as contemporary ideals. In this 
sense, patriotism as a concept is somewhat autonomous of regime and may serve either purpose 
of supporting or criticizing the Kremlin. Second, patriotism potentially shifts the locus of 
legitimacy unavoidably to the people (or nation). As a result, the Kremlin seeks to fuse state 
legitimacy with regime legitimacy, collapsing the distinction between state and regime and 
threatening the people’s sovereign choice by associating regime failure with state failure. The 
success of such a gambit presumably depends on whether popular appraisals of patriotism in 
citizens’ daily lives matches official doctrine. 
I argue that one can understand popular tolerance of authoritarian rule by examining the 
everyday meanings and behaviors that citizens associate with patriotism in today’s Russia. In 
democracies, legitimation is oriented towards governing institutions rather than the specific 
inhabitants of a given office. Electoral legitimacy appears to work precisely because democratic 
institutions endure, in turn ensuring elites of the opportunity to continue competing for popular 
support. By contrast, legitimation in today’s Russia is oriented specifically towards the 
preservation of Putin’s regime. Yet one should not mistake mere regime survival with legitimacy. 
As Walker Connor notes, there are a variety of reasons that citizens may accept or tolerate 
illegitimate regimes, arising from fear, habit, apathy, political and cultural isolation, and 
disorganization.8 For the Kremlin’s current brand of patriotism to be successful in securing 
regime legitimacy, one expects that citizens must embrace its statist vision of the nation while 
accepting the displacement of their political subjectivity.  
                                                            
8 Walker Connor, “Nationalism and Political Illegitimacy,” in Ethnonationalism in the Contemporary World: 
Walker Connor and the Study of Nationalism, ed. Daniele Conversi (New York: Routledge, 2002), 38–41. 
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While it is commonly observed that the Russian public is politically apathetic, there is 
little understanding of how Russians are complicit in the cultivation of regime legitimacy.9 When 
examining closely the ways that ordinary Russians explain and illustrate their understandings of 
patriotism and what it means to be a patriot, one finds a curious mix of individualism and 
conformity that goes well beyond opaque public opinion polling. Most believe the government, 
media, and education system are effective in producing genuine patriotic sentiment, yet few 
believe patriotic duties as claimed by the state are ever fulfilled. At the same time that individuals 
suggest that they are outside of the influence of the state’s patriotic propaganda, they are 
convinced that the vast majority of their fellow citizens are solidly patriotic. Having situated 
themselves as relatively isolated or marginalized in relation to fellow citizens, Russians instead 
embrace an individualist, localized, and apolitical patriotism that takes shape through daily 
practices related to loving the motherland, daily life, and sacrificing public choice. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
The observations in this paper are drawn from over 60 in-depth interviews and focus groups 
conducted in Tiumen’ and Perm’ in 2014-2015.10 The distribution of respondents by age group 
                                                            
9 On popular support for Putin’s regime, see: Timothy J. Colton and Henry E. Hale, “The Putin Vote: 
Presidential Electorates in a Hybrid Regime,” Slavic Review 68, no. 3 (2009): 473–503; Alexander Lukin, 
“Russia’s New Authoritarianism and the Post-Soviet Political Ideal,” Post-Soviet Affairs 25, no. 1 (2009): 66–
92; Richard Rose, William Mishler, and Neil Munro, Popular Support for an Undemocratic Regime: The Changing 
Views of Russians (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Timothy Frye et al., “Is Putin’s Popularity 
Real?,” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo (Washington, D.C.: PONARS Eurasia, November 24, 2015), 
http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/putins-popularity-real. 
10 Funding for this research was provided by a Fulbright research grant. I am grateful to Ekaterina 
Semushkina (Tiumen’) and Valeriia Umanets (Perm’) for invaluable research assistance, and to Dr. Oleg V. 
Lysenko and his team at Perm State Pedagogical University for organizing and conducting the focus 
groups. All errors and omissions are my own responsibility. 
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and occupation and depicted in TABLE 1.11 Selection of respondents for the initial round of 
interviews followed ‘snowball sampling’, making use of initial contacts to reach wider circles of 
respondents with varied political views and socio-economic backgrounds. After the first few 
interviews, however, respondents were less likely to be socially connected.  
I was especially interested in the logics that Russian citizens use to account for patriotic 
practices—in other words, what citizens do with regime narratives and how they convert elements 
of regime narratives into meaningful aspects of daily life. This includes making room for off-
script forms of patriotic practice that do not correspond to regime narratives but emerge from 
ordinary experiences.12 Moreover, allowing respondents to elaborate the meanings and activities 
associated with their understanding of patriotism in their own words allows for coding these 
meanings and identifying areas of overlap that span social, economic, and political cleavages. 
Interviews lasted anywhere from 30 minutes to two hours. Respondents were asked some 
standard questions up front, but allowed to respond in their own words with follow up questions 
to clarify their answers. Though the order and format varied somewhat from person to person, 
                                                            
11 The gender distribution of respondents was 64% male, 36% female. 
12 On this approach in the study of ethnicity and nationalism, see: Rogers Brubaker et al., Nationalist Politics 
and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvania Town (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Melissa L. 
Caldwell, “The Taste of Nationalism: Food Politics in Postsocialist Moscow,” Ethnos: Journal of Anthropology 
67, no. 3 (2002): 295–319, doi:10.1080/0014184022000031185; John L. Comaroff and Jean Comaroff, 
Ethnicity, Inc. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009); Jon E. Fox, “Missing the Mark: Nationalist 
Politics and Student Apathy,” East European Politics & Societies 18, no. 3 (Summer 2004): 363–93, 
doi:10.1177/0888325404266940; Jon E. Fox and Cynthia Miller-Idriss, “Everyday Nationhood,” Ethnicities 
8, no. 4 (2008): 536–63, doi:10.1177/1468796808088925; Catherine Palmer, “From Theory to Practice: 
Experiencing the Nation in Everyday Life,” Journal of Material Culture 3, no. 2 (1998): 175–99; Natalya 
Kosmarskaya and Igor Savin, “Everyday Nationalism in Russia in European Context: Moscow 
Residents’perceptions of Ethnic Minority Migrants and Migration,” in The New Russian Nationalism: 
Imperialism, Ethnicity and Authoritarianism 2000-2015, ed. Pål Kolstø and Helge Blakkisrud (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2016), 132–59. 
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the interviews touched on a series of common topics: what it means to be a patriot in Russia 
today; what duties are associated with being a patriot; what kinds of patriotic symbols are 
encountered in one’s daily routines; and what it means to “love the motherland.”  
All interviews were conducted in Russian by myself with an assistant present, recorded 
on my phone using an external microphone with respondents’ consent, and conducted in public 
locations (most often a coffee shop or park) unless the respondent requested an alternative 
locale. The interviews were transcribed for analysis using process coding13 in Nvivo to generate 
an initial list of patriotic practices. This list was then consolidated into related sets of ‘top-down’ 
and ‘bottom-up’ practices. In reality, of course, no social practice is purely ‘top-down’ or 
‘bottom-up’, as regime narratives merge with popular culture and become appropriated in 
citizens’ daily lives.14 Similarly, elites are unlikely to be ‘above’ or unaffected by nationalism or 
popular culture, though they may play significant roles in shaping their content.15 These meta-
categories of ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ are inductively derived from respondents’ own 
understandings of the directionality of patriotic practices. The most frequently referenced 
practices are listed in TABLE 2.  
Some caveats are in order concerning the conditions and means by which these 
interviews were conducted. As I entered the field in July 2014, relations between the United 
States and Russia were at their lowest point since the Cold War. This was largely related to the 
conflict in eastern Ukraine, the various accusations concerning the downing of Malaysian Airlines 
flight MH17, and the imposition of Western economic sanctions against Russia. The range of 
conspiracy theories concerning American involvement and deception concerning Ukraine 
seemingly increased on a daily basis, with new versions of schemes and machinations floated by a 
variety of figures and sources in Russia’s national and online media. This made for a unique time 
                                                            
13 Johnny Saldana, The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers (Los Angeles, Calif: Sage Publications Ltd, 
2009), 77–81. 
14 My thanks to Yitzhak Brudny for this point. 
15 Joseph M. Whitmeyer, “Elites and Popular Nationalism,” British Journal of Sociology 53, no. 3 (2002): 321–
41, doi:10.1080/0007131022000000536. 
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to visit Russia, but also a very unfortunate time from the standpoint of access. It became almost 
immediately clear that elite interviews were not an option. Whereas during previous research trips 
respondents liked to joke about meeting with an American spy, this time it was a genuine 
suspicion perhaps helped by the fact that my Fulbright grant was paid by the State Department. 
The situation persisted through 2015. In a telling moment, a sociologist in Perm’ resisted the 
offer to conduct my focus groups with a simple explanation: “we are at war, but we do not know 
where the front is.” 
An additional underlying challenge was the near-pervasive belief that there is no such 
thing as academic independence, and that any research project invariably serves the purposes of 
the sponsor. More than once, respondents pressed me to explain for whom (kto zakazal) and for 
what purpose I was conducting my research. This is a reflection of years of politicization of 
academia in Russia, bolstered by the media's frequent use of pseudo-experts who rehearse the 
official line. There was also some suspicion of foreign academics as ‘agents of influence’ (agenty 
vliianiia) working in tandem with the so-called ‘fifth column’ (piataia kolonna), fanned by Putin’s 
own remarks on the occasion of Russia’s annexation of Crimea:  
Some Western politicians are already threatening us with not just sanctions but also the 
prospect of increasingly serious problems on the domestic front. I would like to know 
what it is they have in mind exactly: action by a fifth column, this disparate bunch of 
‘national traitors’, or are they hoping to put us in a worsening social and economic 
situation so as to provoke public discontent?16 
For most Russians, events in Ukraine occurred far away from daily life despite the media 
attention and politicization of events. However, my presence personified those events for some 
respondents with an immediacy that demanded a vocal or visible response. In short, there might 
be little in daily life in provincial Russia that would trigger an outwardly patriotic or nationalist 
response, but the appearance of an American researching Russian patriotism with State 
                                                            
16 Vladimir Putin, “Obrashchenie Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Address by the President of the Russian 
Federation],” Prezident Rossii, March 18, 2014, http://kremlin.ru/transcripts/20603. 
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Department funding potentially served as that trigger. The only way to deal with such 
circumstances was simply to ensure transparency in dealing with respondents. In practice, it also 
meant limiting collaboration with local academics despite my institutional affiliations to contain 
potential unforeseen consequences for them.17  
In addition to the interviews, I used a series of focus groups conducted by local 
moderators as a form of verification.18 By removing myself from interaction, the focus groups 
provided an opportunity to observe the ways that citizens in different occupational categories 
(pensioners, small- and medium-business, state employees, and students) discussed patriotism in 
social settings. The sessions were similarly transcribed and analyzed using the categories of 
practice derived from the interviews. In each focus group, participants were given a scenario in 
which they are asked to suggest items to include in a museum exhibition dedicated to “love for 
the motherland,” spanning different eras: late Soviet era (1970-80s), 1990s, and the present day. 
Throughout, moderators guided participants to think about items related to their daily lives and 
to explain their suggestions. The sessions thus provided a useful means of recording patriotic 
associations and representations as well as observing points of contention.  
 
OFFICIAL PATRIOTIC NARRATIVES  
The Kremlin’s patriotic narratives concentrate on appreciation for Russia’s enduring state history, 
spanning the Tsarist, Soviet, and post-Soviet eras. This stands in contrast to the experience of 
loss of state and empire that characterized the 1990s.19 From the start of the Putin era, it placed 
particular emphasis on patriotic education programs, memorials and public remembrances of the 
                                                            
17 For instance, one of my colleagues in Tiumen’ withdrew from a co-publication project, fearful of the 
career consequences of publishing in an American journal. 
18 On combining interviews with focus groups in this fashion, see: J. Paul Goode and David R. Stroup, 
“Everyday Nationalism: Constructivism for the Masses,” Social Science Quarterly 96, no. 3 (2015): 14–15, 
doi:10.1111/ssqu.12188. 
19 Serguei Alex Oushakine, The Patriotism of Despair: Nation, War, and Loss in Russia (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2009). 
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Great Patriotic War and especially Victory Day.20 This accompanied a significant resurgence of 
military and war themes in popular culture that presented a muscular and assertive semblance of 
national identity.21 Official narratives also restore appreciation for empire (Tsarist and Soviet) as 
national achievement, politicizing its representations in textbooks and histories to the extent that 
comparisons of the present with the imperial past are unavoidable.  
A typical manifestation of this form of patriotism may be observed in regional 
ethnographic (kraevedcheskii) museums in Russia. For example, Tiumen’s City Duma Museum 
featured an exhibit called “I was born in the Soviet Union” (Ia rozhen v Sovetskom soiuze) in 
summer 2014.22 One half of the exhibit featured items associated with a life in a typical Soviet-era 
apartment, including furniture, toys, and tins of food. The other half of the exhibit featured items 
associated with life in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, but with virtually no reference 
to ideology. Rather, the exhibit offered paperweights, identity documents, pins, and other 
souvenirs as the furnishings of a typical career in the Party, which informational placards 
recounted the steps in a typical career path. Joining home life and Party life together in the center 
of the exhibit was a re-constructed school room, flanked by a pair of shelves with items 
representing unifying events: Yuri Gagarin’s space flight and the Moscow Olympics in 1980. The 
significance of such an exhibit, of course, is its banality, or the conscious connecting of past and 
present through the notion of a normal life lived simultaneously by all Russians. Indeed, similar 
exhibits may be observed in kraevedcheskii museums throughout Russia. 
                                                            
20 Valerie Sperling, “The Last Refuge of a Scoundrel: Patriotism, Militarism and the Russian National 
Idea,” Nations and Nationalism 9, no. 2 (2003): 235–53, doi:10.1111/1469-8219.00084; Valerie Sperling, 
“Making the Public Patriotic: Militarism and Anti-Militarism in Russia,” in Russian Nationalism and the 
National Reassertion of Russia, ed. Marlene Laruelle, Reprint edition (New York: Routledge, 2009), 218–71.  
21 David Gillespie, “Defence of the Realm: The ‘New’ Russian Patriotism on Screen,” The Journal of Power 
Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies. Pipss.org, no. Issue 3 (October 1, 2005), http://pipss.revues.org/369; 
Stephen M. Norris, Blockbuster History in the New Russia: Movies, Memory, and Patriotism (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2012). 
22 Author’s field observations, Tiumen’, Russia, July 30, 2014. 
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Of course, official patriotic narratives also cultivate strategic silences and selective 
remembering about the failures of either imperial system.23 In the opening ceremonies of the 
Sochi Olympics, for example, the elaborate re-enactment of Russian history portrayed the 
twentieth century in two parts: the mechanization of society, cast in red lights to represent early 
Soviet development, followed by a sparkling rush to modernity that connected the post-war 
Soviet Union with today’s Russia. The two periods were divided by a moment of silence to mark 
the cataclysm of the Second World War. In this fashion, the survival of the Russian state and its 
achievements took the place of the nation, and nowhere did one observe any indication of the 
Soviet Union’s collapse or the various malaises that brought it to self-destruction.  
In a vivid instance of selective remembrance, Putin’s speech to mark the annexation of 
Crimea addressed the historical injustice of Crimea’s transfer to Ukraine by the Politburo in 1954: 
This was the personal initiative of the Communist Party head Nikita Khrushchev. What 
stood behind this decision of his – a desire to win the support of the Ukrainian political 
establishment or to atone for the mass repressions of the 1930’s in Ukraine – is for 
historians to figure out. What matters now is that this decision was made in clear 
violation of the constitutional norms that were in place even then. The decision was 
made behind the scenes. Naturally, in a totalitarian state nobody bothered to ask the 
citizens of Crimea and Sevastopol. They were faced with the fact. People, of course, 
wondered why all of a sudden Crimea became part of Ukraine. But on the whole – and 
we must state this clearly, we all know it – this decision was treated as a formality of 
sorts because the territory was transferred within the boundaries of a single state. Back 
                                                            
23 Ruth Wodak and Rudolf de Cillia, “Commemorating the Past: The Discursive Construction of Official 
Narratives about the `Rebirth of the Second Austrian Republic’,” Discourse & Communication 1, no. 3 
(August 1, 2007): 337–63, doi:10.1177/1750481307079206; James V. Wertsch, “Blank Spots in Collective 
Memory: A Case Study of Russia,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 617, no. 1 
(2008): 58–71, doi:10.1177/0002716207312870. 
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then, it was impossible to imagine that Ukraine and Russia may split up and become two 
separate states. However, this has happened.24 
With this bit of revisionist history25, Putin absolved the Soviet system of responsibility for 
Crimea’s transfer to Ukraine by laying the blame squarely on Khrushchev, concluding that 
Ukraine’s sovereignty (with the breakup of the USSR) is the greater historical injustice.  
  Regime narratives about contemporary politics tend to characterize ‘non-systemic’ 
political opposition as attempting to organize a Maidan (in reference to the mass protests in 
Ukraine) in Russia, or alternatively of simply being a vocal, aggrieved minority of malcontents. 
Hence, in relation to the non-systemic opposition and related organizations (like ‘foreign agents’ 
and the so-called ‘fifth column’), being a patriot means supporting the government against those 
who (allegedly) seek to undermine or overthrow it. With regard to foreign policy, patriotism for 
many is linked to supporting the Kremlin (particularly Putin, Prime Minister Dmitrii Medvedev, 
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu) as a bulwark against 
Western influence and meddling, though it also involves constant comparisons with the Soviet 
era and (by contrast) the 1990s.26  
As a whole, the Kremlin’s patriotic narratives may be seen as synthesizing the 
importance of service sacrifice for the state, particularly through military service and war; the 
unexceptional normality of the state and the current regime as inscribed in, and exemplifying, an 
unbroken arc of Russian statehood; the exceptionality of Russian culture and traditions, and the 
related importance of resisting alien (not exclusively foreign) influences to safeguard Russia’s 
                                                            
24 Putin, “Obrashchenie Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Address by the President of the Russian 
Federation].” 
25 For a reliable account, see: Mark Kramer, “Why Did Russia Give Away Crimea Sixty Years Ago?,” 
CWIHP E-Dossier (Wilson Center, March 19, 2014), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/why-did-
russia-give-away-crimea-sixty-years-ago. 
26 J. Paul Goode, “Everyday Patriotism and Putin’s Foreign Policy,” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo, July 12, 
2016, http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/everyday-patriotism-and-putins-foreign-policy. 
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present and future; and increasingly the substitutability of Russian (Rossiisskii) citizenship with 
Russian (russkii) ethnicity. The state’s expectations for ordinary citizens in accordance with its 
patriotic narratives may be found in the State Program for Patriotic Education (SPPE), which 
began in 2001 and has been renewed every five years since. According to the draft 2016 program, 
patriotism is “the foundational orientation of citizens’ social behavior, expressing a higher 
purpose in life and individuals’ activities, showing duty and responsibility before society, forming 
an understanding of the priority of societal interests above individuals and self-sacrifice, [and] 
disregarding danger to one’s life and health in the defense of the Fatherland’s interests.”27 The 
essential goals of the SPPE include “creating conditions for raising citizens’ accountability for the 
fate of the country, raising the level of societal consolidation for resolving tasks related to the 
provision of national security and stable development of the Russian Federation, strengthening 
citizens’ sense of participation (soprichastnost’) in the great history and culture of Russia, [and] 
educating citizens who love their motherland and family, possessing an active position in life.”28 
 
CITIZENS’ PATRIOTIC PRACTICES 
Turning from official patriotic narratives to the accounts of ordinary Russians in interviews and 
focus groups, I focus here on some of the most commonly referenced categories of practice, 
spanning both top-down and bottom-up varieties: loving, activating, performing, comparing, 
                                                            
27 Gosudarstvennaia programma “Patrioticheskoe vospitanie grazhdan Rossiiskoi Federatsii na 2016-202 
gody”. Proekt. [State program “patriotic education of citizens of the Russian Federation”. Draft.] 
(http://gospatriotprogramma.ru/programma%202016-2020/proekt/proekt.php, last accessed January 17, 
2016). 
28 Postanovlenie Pravitel’stva RF ot 30 dekabria 2015 g. N 1493 “O gosudarstvennoi programme 
“Patrioticheskoe vospitanie grazhdan Rossiiskoi Federatsii na 2016-2020 gody” [On the state program 
‘Patriotic education of citizens of the Russian Federation, 2016-2020]” 
(http://gospatriotprogramma.ru/upload/gospotriot_2016_2020.pdf, last accessed August 8, 2016). 
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living, improving, and choosing.29 These are not cumulative in any linear sense, and contradictory 
attitudes and orientations are quite common. The task in examining these practices is not so 
much to impose an artificial consistency, but to attempt to re-create the logics that respondents 
invoke (or evade) in reconciling various forms of patriotic practice in their daily lives. In the 
concluding section, I will consider their significance to the extent that they correspond to official 
patriotic narratives. 
 
Loving: The Motherland ‘As Is’ 
When asked to define patriotism, virtually every respondent answered the same way: to love the 
motherland (liubov’ k rodine). This is largely consistent with survey responses (see TABLE 3), but 
also opaque in meaning. As one respondent put it, “you don’t even have to think about it before 
you say it.”30 This almost mechanical answer conceals a range of unexamined orientations. 
Respondents struggled when pressed to explain how one should love the motherland, or even to 
describe it. In most cases, respondents focused rather on the ‘little motherland’ (malaia rodina), or 
the town, neighborhood, or village of one’s birth or where one lives. However, they also related 
patriotism to a range of spatial and social concepts mentioned in combination with love for one’s 
city, compatriots, country, culture, government, history, region, and general surroundings.  
Many respondents characterized patriotism as categorically positive and contrasted it 
with chauvinistic attitudes. Insofar as patriotism involves loving the motherland, its authenticity 
or sincerity is determined by way of emotional connection. Yet it is also established through 
acceptance—that is, loving the motherland ‘as is’, rather than in accordance with some sort of 
ideal: 
Traditionally, patriotism is love for one’s fatherland (sic). If you ask, “why do you love 
your mama?” or “why do you love your daughter?” I cannot answer. I’ll say, “Because 
                                                            
29 An exhaustive analysis of all practices would go beyond the confines of this article, such that the 
practices not addressed in this paper will be examined in separate works. Ethnicizing, in particular, requires 
substantial analysis in relation to the ways that Russians differentiate patriotism from nationalism. 
30 Respondent 112556, Tiumen’, August 12, 2014. 
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she is [my] mama,” or “because she is [my] daughter.” You ask me, “why do you love 
your motherland?” I’ll also say, because it is [my] motherland (Respondent 110231).31  
In a large part, a patriot is a person who loves the motherland, regardless of what kind of 
motherland or anything that happened. …It doesn’t matter what kind of leader we have 
today, or what kind of leader we’ll have tomorrow (Respondent 151501).32 
For the older generation the motherland, more than likely, is connected with the USSR. 
Right now a new understanding is spreading. Thus the motherland is the Russian 
Federation plus Crimea, plus something else, maybe some part of Ukraine… 
(Respondent 175248)33 
In this fashion, the imperative to love the motherland takes priority over judgments of regime 
and leadership. As the last comment illustrates, accepting the motherland ‘as is’ does not imply 
that it needs well-defined or stable borders. On the contrary, changes in state borders associated 
with the motherland are to be accepted (and loved) with equanimity, though expanding the 
motherland’s borders appears preferable over their contraction. This became particularly 
apparent when one of the focus groups was asked about aspects of patriotism they would like to 
see in Russia’s future: 
Participant A: Expansion of territory, expansion of borders. 
Question in the room: By what means? 
Participant A: Like Crimea, returning [obratno]. 
Participant B: Alaska, for example. 
Moderator: Are you serious, or is that a joke? 
Participant B: Serious. 
Participant C: They’ve been talking about it, about expanding our borders to Alaska. 
Moderator: I missed something. I didn’t hear about it. 
                                                            
31 Author’s interview, Perm’, December 3, 2015. 
32 Author’s interview, Tiumen’, August 10, 2014. 
33 Author’s interview, Tiumen’, August 13, 2014. 
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Participant C: in Rossiiskaia Gazeta there was an article about revising Alaska’s borders.  
Moderator: Alaska? Are you certain? Alaska is a state of the US. How can we change 
Alaska’s borders? Or are we preparing for war over Alaska? (laughter)  
Participant C: No, wait, I mixed something up…  
This approach to loving the motherland ‘as is’ found reflection in other objects of love that are 
impervious to individual agency or choice, such as culture, history, or government. The absence 
of choice means that loving the motherland sometimes feels to citizens like a dysfunctional 
relationship. As one respondent put it, “that’s what patriotism is: love for the motherland. 
Though it would be nice if it were mutual.”34 
 
Activating: The Patriotism of Others 
All respondents saw patriotism as activated ‘from above’, most often attributed to the 
government, the media, or education. Discussions of ‘activated patriotism’ featured a mixture of 
causal and normative associations. Most respondents believed government, media, and education 
were (or could be) effective in producing a uniformly patriotic view among Russians. For some, 
this was seen as natural and expected: the government or schools are supposed to produce 
patriots. For others, ‘activated patriotism’ was expected but unsuccessfully executed by the state 
owing to lack of funding, corruption, or incompetence. Still others complained about patriotism 
as artificially manipulating people:  
I think the government’s use of patriotism is positive. Again, this is because, I hope, that 
eventually through this patriotism society will come to love its place of residence – that 
is, not just self-sacrifice, but not littering on the street. Of course, I don’t exclude that 
the government uses it for its own interests, but this is completely normal. (Respondent 
173010)35 
                                                            
34 Author’s interview, Perm’, November 27, 2015. 
35 Author’s interview, Tiumen’, August 8, 2014. 
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[Love] should come from the individual. That is, if they tell you from above, “yes, we 
should love the motherland,” it’s not faithful. Cultivating love for the motherland should 
come through understanding of that motherland, study of the motherland… 
(Respondent 122134)36 
I think it’s impossible to make someone feel love [for the motherland] if it doesn’t come 
from within. It’s strange, almost savage. On the whole, when people of my generation 
say that they are doing some kind of patriotic things, for them it is an opportunity to 
realize their value in the absence of loneliness. (Respondent 161822)37  
Some respondents were more specific in connecting government and media with the effective 
and instrumental manipulation of patriotic messages to deflect opinion about the regime or 
domestic policies. 
 
Most striking was that almost all respondents characterized the activation of patriotic sentiment 
as something that happens to other people (usually characterized as youth, older generations, or 
veterans). Yet they also estimated that the vast majority of their fellow citizens were genuinely 
affected by the activation of patriotic sentiment. In other words, few respondents were willing to 
claim to have been affected by the activation of patriotic sentiment, contrasting themselves with a 
patriotic (albeit deceived) majority or suggesting that the majority of people are engaged in public 
dissimulation: 
Putin’s rating is about 90%, if you believe the surveys. Not even a rating but level of 
support for his actions. It’s these people that drink in propaganda. I know people that 
never used to watch television, thinking that they were being deceived. But now they 
watch and believe that everything said is true. (Respondent 154510)38 
                                                            
36 Author’s interview, Perm’, November 24, 2015. 
37 Author’s interview, Tiumen’, August 10, 2015. 
38 Author’s interview, Tiumen’, August 7, 2015. 
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I understood what the government could demand of me and that, at least, I’m not 
prepared to sacrifice my own interests and priorities. …Yes, I work in a government 
structure, so maybe that sounds peculiar. But I assure you, that the majority are like that. 
[laughs] (Respondent 182619)39 
Respondents further explained the contrast between self and majority with reference to 
additional reinforcing distinctions concerning education, rationality, with authentic patriotism 
associated with lower education and irrationality. When it comes to age, there are multiple 
gradations, with the oldest and youngest respondents perceiving each other as most authentically 
patriotic. However, most respondents conveyed the impression that they stood alone, isolated by 
the mass activation of patriotic sentiment.  
Hence, one finds citizens distancing themselves from state patriotism at the same time 
they contrast themselves with a presumed patriotic majority. Not surprisingly, Levada Center 
polls on educational priorities found that only a quarter of Russians think that schools need to 
produce patriots, while more than half favor preparing “thinking people, capable of taking 
responsibility.”40 In combination, these observations suggest that the activation of patriotic 
displays ‘from above’ induces a kind of preference falsification (see concluding discussion). 
Indeed, the differentiation of individual from majority largely disappeared in the focus group 
discussions. In this fashion, it is easy to see how activated patriotism—even when viewed as 
inauthentic—works to raise barriers to collective action. 
 
Performing: Patriotism for Show 
Even as one accepts the motherland ‘as is’, respondents identified different categories of practice 
through which a patriot can go about the task of loving the motherland. These can be divided 
                                                            
39 Author’s interview, Perm’, November 19, 2015. 
40 Analiticheskii Tsentr Iurii Levady, Obshchestvennoe Mnenie - 2014 [Public Opinion - 2014] (Moscow: Levada-
Tsentr, 2014), 82, http://www.levada.ru/sites/default/files/om14.pdf. 
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into two broad categories: those practices which are externally imposed (by the state, by society) 
and abstract in nature, and those which are directly associated with individual behavior or agency.  
At the intersection of ‘loving’ and ‘activating’, one particularly finds patriotism described 
as ceremony: simulating traditional Russian hospitality for foreigners, observing Victory Day, or 
simple flag waving are all examples of how Russian patriots demonstrate their love for the 
motherland in accordance with prescribed social and legal scripts. Respondents sometimes called 
these variants of practice ‘patriotism for show’ (ura-patriotizm or pokaznoi patriotizm). ‘Patriotism 
for show’ is episodic and intermittent, arising at designated moments like holiday parades or 
sporting events like the World Cup or the Olympics:  
Well I don’t see it every day. That is, take for example some kinds of holidays. Victory 
Day, without a doubt. It’s a patriotic day for all in general. But on ordinary days, well, in 
principle I wouldn’t say so… (Respondent 154510)41 
Well, of course, during the Olympics, we all became patriots. We all followed the 
triumphs of our sportsmen, we all discussed them, and patriotism was very, very timely. 
(Respondent 121427)42  
Respondents also referred to performing or fulfilling one’s constitutional responsibilities as 
patriotic, by which they meant military service. It is perhaps worth noting that not a single 
respondent suggested voting as a constitutional responsibility or even as patriotic.  
In contrast to spectators at parades or sporting events for whom patriotism is ‘for show’, 
active duty personnel and veterans (along with pensioners) were widely assumed to be 
authentically patriotic in such performances: 
I have my own business, after all, and I thought a lot about how people behave. And so I 
considered whether I should start using patriotic themes. I conducted my own survey 
and understood that one shouldn’t mix business with politics. You can use [patriotism] if 
the target audience is appropriate – that is, soldiers, pensioners, not youth though the 
                                                            
41 Author’s interview, Tiumen’, August 7, 2015. 
42 Author’s interview, Perm’, December 4, 2015. 
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country supports them, for instance, for having children. That is, the topic sticks to just 
three types, but others don’t react to it. They don’t even think about it. As long as people 
don’t say that they’re Russian [russkie], they don’t even think about it. I think Victory Day 
is done so that people don’t forget about it. (Respondent 154217)43 
In this fashion, the activation of patriotism through ceremony and performance is understood as 
a momentary activation of national identity, but it was not perceived as constantly active or 
binding except for those who continue to serve in the military, pensioners, or state employees 
(biudzhetniki) – in other words, those whose jobs depend upon the state budget.  
Similarly, one finds awareness of official expectations that patriots ought to be ready to 
defend the motherland (also expressed as the country or even as domestic markets) when called, 
to preserve Russian culture and traditions, and to sacrifice (possibly one’s life or well-being) for 
the motherland. Yet these mostly abstract notions were felt as obligation or duty, and many 
respondents readily admitted to avoiding military service44, being annoyed by flag waving, or 
finding patriotism to be unprofitable for their business. In other words, the duties and 
obligations associated with loving the motherland in official patriotic narratives proved, in fact, a 
poor guide to how ordinary Russians actually practice patriotism beyond such episodic 
performances.  
 
Comparing: The Normality of Russia 
As a practice, comparing is a form of talk that situates the present in relation to a country’s past 
or in relation to other countries. It is a means not merely of making sense of the present, but 
specifically of accounting for why it is normal or exceptional. In the Kremlin’s patriotic 
narratives, legitimation is sought by situating Russia as a continuation of previous imperial eras 
(mainly the Soviet era or sometimes Tsarist Russia), or relating Russia to neighboring or distant 
                                                            
43 Author’s interview, Tiumen’, August 6, 2014. 
44 Respondents who served in the military resisted the use of the word dolg (duty) because it implied some 
degree of choice. Instead, they preferred to talk of military service as an obligation (obiazannost’).  
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Others (former Soviet states or the West). Comparing as a ‘bottom-up’ practice similarly serves 
as a foil for Russians to make sense of the present and to establish one’s relationship to it. In this 
sense, comparing is an interpretive practice that may also serve as an assertion of authority over 
history or culture.  
Comparisons with former Soviet states usually served to confirm the normalcy of 
Russian politics, though respondents who opposed the war in Ukraine tended to invert the 
nature of such comparisons and viewed the relationship as exposing Russia’s political 
backwardness. When invoking comparisons with Western countries (Europe and the US), 
respondents emphasized their appreciation for those countries’ clean and orderly appearance. 
Cleanliness (as discussed below) also featured as a prominent dimension of living daily life as a 
form of patriotism.  
When comparing Soviet history with US history, it was common for respondents to 
claim that an historical process during the Soviet era was shared by the US:  
Russia…is a multinational country. The USSR in its time was understood as a ‘prison of 
nations.’ Because, at times, we united peoples using violent means… In the history of 
[the US] it was just the same, as with the history of any large government. (Respondent 
145822)45 
The concept of patriotism for us hasn’t changed its meaning, not in pre-revolutionary 
Russia, not in the Soviet era, not now. That is, it always signifies love for the motherland, 
for one’s fatherland, but if we take other states for example, you can see similar cases. 
For instance, you could look at the war for independence of the US, the conflict between 
Great Britain and its North American colonies. You’ve probably seen the Mel Gibson 
movie, The Patriot? (Respondent 145058)46  
                                                            
45 Author’s interview, Tiumen’, August 15, 2014. 
46 Author’s interview, Perm’, November 27, 2015. 
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Such comparisons aimed to minimize Russia’s historical exceptionality and, by implication, 
strengthen the claim to the normalcy of the present. However, the comparisons were not always 
flattering. Comparisons with US history were also invoked to condemn present day Russia: 
I really like those old black-and-white American films… the McCarthy period was 
terrifying. A couple of FBI officers come up to a woman and tell her, “something bad 
happened to your son,” and she fears, “what if he joined the Communist Party? No, 
surely he died in a car wreck.” Here it can happen just the same with [anyone]. Some 
police come up and say that you spoke out against the war with Ukraine. (Respondent 
175248)47 
Even in such instances, the fact that the latter respondent reached for an example from US 
history—rather than, say, Stalin’s terror—preserved the impression that Russia is still normal in 
the sense of a shared (albeit unfortunate) history. More importantly, the selective invocation of 
US history may serve a pragmatic purpose of observing the strategic silences about the Stalinist 
past cultivated in official narratives. Almost certainly, comparisons with the West were prompted 
at least in part by the interview context, possibly reflecting respondents’ desire to communicate a 
point creatively and efficiently to a self-identified American interviewer. Indeed, comparisons 
with the West almost completely disappeared in focus group discussions, replaced by 
comparisons with other periods in Russian history. 
In comparisons with the Soviet era, the most common point of reference was the 1960s 
and 1970s though respondents often lacked precision in their comparisons (increasingly evident 
in focus groups with younger cohorts). Rather, general assessments of the Soviet era 
predominated in comparisons with the present. Hence, the Soviet era was presented as a 
necessary stage of development, as an example of stability, or even as less of a police state than 
today’s Russia. In focus groups, the Soviet era was remembered with pride and nostalgia, with 
respondents usually associating patriotism with ordinary items from their grandparents’ 
apartments. Yet nostalgia inevitably leaves the present day wanting by comparison, and 
                                                            
47 Author’s interview, Tiumen’, August 13, 2014. 
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participants often called for a return to Soviet-era education and social practices, or even for a 
return to Soviet-style patriotism. In effect, the Soviet era has become increasingly relevant in 
comparison with the present but it is also something of a cipher.  
In contrast to evaluations of the Soviet era, assessments of the 1990s were definitive. As 
one respondent put it, “It seems to me the 1990s were the least patriotic time in our country.”48  
Another commented that, “in the 1990s in Russia…everything was awful. If there was news, then 
it was bad.”49 These were common sentiments. In the collective memory, the 1990s are a black 
hole of interrupted time situated between the Soviet era and Putin’s regime. One respondent 
characterized the 1990s as a “forbidden topic” for conversation in family gatherings.50 Focus 
group participants also struggled to come up with a list of patriotic associations with the 1990s. 
The decade lacked definitive markers in time compared to the decade’s bookends, with perestroika 
blurring into the early-1990s. Interview respondents even defined the Yeltsin era in terms of 
Putin’s rise to power: “Today people don’t talk at all about the 1990s. Either [they talk about] the 
USSR or the period just before Putin became president. Not the early 1990s, but before Putin’s 
rule.”51 Indeed, only a couple of respondents even mentioned Yeltsin’s name in relation to the 
1990s.  
Yet if the Kremlin’s legitimating narrative emphasizes comparisons with the 1990s to 
highlight the stability and prosperity of the present day, respondents drew different lessons:  
If at the end of the 1990s…the individual played some kind of role, now the individual 
takes a back seat. And they try to convince people that everything should be for the 
country, that Russia should be great. (Respondent 154510)52 
 
                                                            
48 Author’s interview, Perm’, November 26, 2015. 
49 Author’s interview, Tiumen’, August 10, 2014. 
50 Author’s interview, Perm’, November 25, 2015. 
51 Author’s interview, Tiumen’, August 8, 2014. 
52 Author’s interview, Tiumen’, August 7, 2014. 
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There was democracy – some kind or other, but it existed. Local government developed 
and, in fact, Russia was saved from below, not from above. It saved itself. (Respondent 
110526)53  
In contrast to the 1990s, respondents viewed the present as less creative, less free, and more 
politicized. This was particularly the case with reference to the official brand of patriotism, which 
was interpreted as an attempt to deflect attention from domestic matters or to revive Soviet era 
propaganda. 
 
Living: Clean in Russia 
For Russians not actively involved in the military or politics, patriotism ‘from below’ most often 
found expression through the ways people live their daily lives, raise their children, do their jobs, 
and even through the simple fact of survival.  
For me, as a simple citizen, I think that my patriotism is shown in the fact that I work 
here, I spend my money here, I raise my child here and plan my future here, because I 
don’t want to go anywhere else. It’s my home. (Respondent 145822)54 
What is a patriot? Well, probably…I think it is every person born in Russia, working 
one’s whole life, and not even a thought of leaving Russia. Well, and by my actions I 
affirm that I love my country, that I work here, that I share those feelings with people 
around me. Something like that. (Respondent 100446)55  
 
For a number of respondents, simple survival or day-to-day existence was not enough. 
Instead, they associated patriotism literally and metaphorically with cleanliness. Littering in this 
sense is emblematic of hypocrisy, in that one cannot legitimately claim to be patriotic if you are 
noisy or throw trash on the street:  
                                                            
53 Author’s interview, Perm’, December 10, 2015. 
54 Author’s interview, Tiumen’, August 15, 2014. 
55 Author’s interview, Perm’, December 9, 2015. 
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Personally for me patriotism is when you live in your city and you don’t yell that you’re a 
patriot, but you do something to be a patriot. If I were to yell that I’m a patriot and then 
throw cigarette butts on the street, then I can’t say that I’m a patriot. (Respondent 
165512)56  
Of course, it in no way means that I should watch Channel One and in listen in awe to 
the president’s address because it’s the President of Russia and he will tell me what I 
should do. [Patriotism] is when I don’t throw trash out the window, but when I carry it 
to the designated place for it. Or when I tell my child about his relatives, it means…our 
city has some meaning for Russia, how her great grandfather fought or other kinds of 
things that are completely unrelated to government policy. (Respondent 121427)57   
The juxtaposition of shouting or yelling and littering with being a patriot is a pointed (if implied) 
contrast with ‘patriotism for show’, especially in relation to official patriotic displays (parades or 
street celebrations) involving lots of noise and litter. Understood in this fashion, being an 
everyday patriot can be a covert form of dissenting from the activation of patriotic sentiment 
‘from above’ that individuals exercise through private (rather than social) approbation.  
 
Improving: Just Do It (Quietly). 
In evaluations of politics, respondents characterized this approbation through a simple test of 
whether one has done anything to improve the motherland: 
There are two aspects. First, it’s one’s profession: doctors are supposed to heal, 
politicians should make laws that are comfortable for the people. Second, insofar as they 
were chosen by the people, they should feel grateful to the people for their election and 
they should somehow meet their expectations. Theoretically, a person goes into 
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government not because he wants power but because he wants to help people. He goes 
into government to improve the life of the people. (Respondent 112556)58 
[If] one wishes one’s country well, find something that’s wrong and try to fight it or 
show those people who are supposed to fight it. And know for certain that things really 
are good in your country. At the same time, listen to different positions, be able to listen 
to different positions and be able to comprehend them. …Not imposed by someone’s 
side, but what you yourself see and feel. (Respondent 104918)59  
Hence, patriotism is realized through living clean, doing one’s job, staying quiet, and improving 
one’s surroundings. In this important sense, everyday patriotism dovetails with a withdrawal from 
active participation in public politics, perhaps explaining in part the often-observed apolitical 
tendencies of Russian citizens. Moreover, insofar as this form of everyday patriotism serves as a 
basis for evaluating the work of politicians, it cannot escape notice that this collection of personal 
qualities is most often embodied by Vladimir Putin in the popular imagination.60 Authentic 
patriotism, like Putin, is above politics. In practical terms, of course, this puts every other 
politician in the country in an impossible position.  
 
Choosing: Russia is Hard 
To this point, there has been little discussion of agency in relation to patriotism. Rather, the most 
commonly observed everyday practices related to patriotism were oriented towards coping with 
daily life. However, Russians do recognize that patriotism may be evidenced through one’s daily 
choices in ways that are closely related to living and improving. Individual patriotic choices emerge 
within specific contexts, particularly in relation to the activation of patriotic sentiment ‘from 
above’ or the ways patriotism is lived on a quotidian level. In terms of the former, respondents 
                                                            
58 Author’s interview, Tiumen’, August 12, 2014. 
59 Author’s interview, Perm’, November 27, 2015. 
60 Julie A. Cassiday and Emily D. Johnson, “Putin, Putiniana and the Question of a Post-Soviet Cult of 
Personality,” Slavonic & East European Review 88, no. 4 (2010): 681–707.  
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characterized patriotism in terms of making hard choices rather than visible displays of support 
for the government: 
See, if a person has gangrene, then you have to cut off the limb. You can’t put it off. 
That’s how it is in Russia. You have to resolve the problem. It will be painful, but you 
have to do it. (Respondent 133514)61 
In most cases, making the hard decision meant simply choosing not to leave Russia when one has 
the means and opportunity to do so, or simply not wanting to leave but to continue living in 
Russia.62  
I had the chance to live outside Russia. I can live in the US, [but] I chose to live in this 
country. That is, I live here not because that’s how it is, but because I chose to do so. 
…the majority of people live in this country not because they chose it, but because they 
live here and they don’t have a choice. They lost their point of reference for what to love 
here. (Respondent 160136)63  
The nature of the hard decision is inflected by the degree to which respondents believed one can 
also choose one’s motherland. For those who believe that one cannot change one’s motherland, 
choosing to stay is a patriotic decision in the face of the manifold difficulties and stress of daily 
existence in Russia. Hence, one respondent observed that teachers have to be “big patriots” 
because they simply “can’t live on what the state pays you.”64 By contrast, respondents who 
suggested one can choose one’s motherland (typically more affluent businessmen) saw choosing 
to stay in Russia as a positive assertion of Russia’s value despite the attractions of living or 
                                                            
61 Author’s interview, Tiumen’, August 6, 2014. 
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working abroad: “for example, they might offer to pay you more in the West, but you’re a patriot 
so you answer that you want to work here.”65 
In terms of choice, then, authentic patriotism is expressed by making tough or possibly 
even irrational decisions: in political terms, to adopt unpopular but needed reforms could be 
considered patriotic, though respondents often opposed politics to patriotism. Choosing to work 
or provide public goods in the absence of worthy pay is patriotic. And, ultimately, choosing to 
stay in Russia when one has the means to leave is patriotic. It bears observing that the latter two 
aspects of choosing are not really about choice or action, at all, so much as they are about 
acceptance and rationalization. For example, in relation to the notion of living and improving 
discussed above, a true patriot is obligated to do one’s job and improve one’s surroundings 
quietly. If you have a complaint, a true patriot should not be noisy about it or make other people 
unhappy. Instead, a patriot makes the hard decision to accept difficult living conditions in the 
name of improving one’s community or surroundings by providing public goods, doing one’s 
job, and staying put. In brief, when it comes time to make a hard choice, the patriotic choice is to 
choose not to choose. Accepting this displacement of agency might be the hardest choice of all. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This cursory glance at citizens’ patriotic practices provides a foundation for linking varieties of 
practice with orientations towards regime (see TABLE 4). In addition to dividing categories of 
practice in terms of their directionality (top-down or bottom-up), closer scrutiny suggests that 
orientations towards the Kremlin also corresponds to the perceived authenticity of a practice. 
Inauthentic practices are those that are performed or activated ‘from above’. Respondents tended 
to view inauthentic practices as personally unconvincing and yet effective in manipulating other 
people. Invoking patriotism for political gain or profit was further discussed as cynical and 
opportunistic. In interviews, these were often associated with ritualized support of the regime. In 
focus groups, however, the discussion and representation of patriotic performances shifted from 
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inauthentic to authentic with only occasional dissent. This contrast between interviews and focus 
groups suggests that individual Russians may be disdainful of officially-sponsored patriotism in 
private while openly supportive in social settings.  
Conspicuous by their absence, of course, are any authentic patriotic practices that relate 
specifically to regime support. The disappearance of the 1990s from personal timelines is notable 
in this regard since most Russians associate the decade with a flawed democratic experiment. An 
ambivalence towards regime also coincides with the delegation of freedoms and sovereignty to 
the Russian presidency, which was originally conceived as being ‘above politics’. This missing 
category further corresponds to the observed tendency among interview respondents of 
distinguishing between real or authentic patriotism and patriotism ‘for show’, as well as the 
assumption that the vast majority of one’s fellow citizens are (perhaps inauthentic) patriots. Once 
again, the contrast between interviews and focus groups serves to illustrate this dynamic: whereas 
not a single interview respondent named Putin as patriotic, he was mentioned in every focus 
group (though in two cases, accompanied by knowing laughter).  
By the same token, authentic ‘bottom-up’ practices are uniformly associated with 
ambivalence towards regime type. Patriotism for Russians is not about democracy or 
authoritarianism, but acceptance and tolerance: accepting the motherland ‘as is’, accepting 
Russia’s history as normal, tolerating a limited scope of agency, and tolerating the absence of real 
choice. In other words, authentic patriotism is private and even romantic. And it is also obsessed 
with cleanliness. As Anderson (2006) notes in his analysis of patriotism, cleanliness is a common 
symbolic component of civic responsibility: “…it represents an awareness of the individual as 
inextricably part of one’s community, and posits an ideal state exemplified through individual 
behavior: if individuals act individually to keep things clean, then the state and nation will be 
clean.”66  
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Yet if cleanliness is related to individual patriotism, how to reconcile this with individual 
perceptions of other citizens as activated (inauthentic) patriots? The answer lies in the subtle 
difference in usage between ‘patriotism’ and ‘being a patriot’ in Russia. The practices related to 
‘patriotism’ tend to be individual, local, and normative. Respondents talked about “my sense of 
patriotism” as an ideal, though not necessarily as something shared by all Russians. They 
expressed an intense attachment to their little motherland (malaia Rodina) and enjoyment from 
visiting and learning about different parts of their home regions, while the motherland as a whole 
was felt to be too abstract and distant to be meaningful. Hence, respondents associated 
patriotism in their daily lives with such practices as living clean, raising one’s children properly, 
not making trouble for others, doing one’s job, and improving one’s surroundings. For the most 
part, these practices are not imposed from above and instead tend to be reproduced through 
family circles and friendship. Strikingly, none of the practices associated with patriotism are even 
remotely political. Rather, they focus on living well and maintaining appropriate relations with 
others.  
By contrast, ‘being a patriot’ is expressly political, denoting both loyalty and collective 
membership. This helps to explain, in part, why many respondents grew visibly uncomfortable 
when asked what it means to be a patriot and sought to clarify whether I wanted their opinion 
“or how it is for everyone” (ili kak u vsekh). ‘Being a patriot’ is not self-defined in the same way as 
patriotism because it involves the subordination of one’s own opinions and interests to that of 
the collective. ‘Being a patriot’ ultimately signifies loyalty and membership in accordance with 
existing tropes which are defined by the state or ‘from above’. Practices associated with ‘being a 
patriot’ therefore include various forms of mobilization and support (activating), or duty and 
emulation (performing), that nonetheless are mostly separate from citizens’ daily lives.  
On the one hand, this difference between ‘patriotism’ and ‘being a patriot’ confirms that 
official patriotic narratives have been successful in transmitting the kinds of public practices that 
signal loyalty, albeit at the cost of appearing to others as ‘patriotism for show’. On the other 
hand, outward conformity with prescribed patriotic practice does not make one patriotic. Rather, 
individuals have their own notions of patriotism, imagined in terms of an apolitical ideal that 
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does not require public display or civic engagement. In this sense, official patriotism in Russia 
cannot be said to generate regime legitimacy so much as it produces and regulates public displays 
of regime loyalty, even when such displays appear to others to be ritualized or inauthentic. The 
resulting perception among individuals is that society is comprised of loyal patriots—a perception 
reinforced by the narrowing of public space for the airing of dissent.  
The public/private distinction between ‘being a patriot’ and ‘patriotism’ bears some 
similarity to preference falsification, suggesting not merely that patriotism masks a privately-held 
sense of the regime’s illegitimacy but that a breakthrough moment could provoke a popular 
political response and cascade into regime change.67 The crucial difference, here, is that the 
privately-held sense of patriotism is deeply personal and apolitical. Not only does it lack an 
alternative political project for mobilization, everyday patriotism views politics as generally 
opposed to patriotism. Consequently, it might be more accurate to call this public/private 
distinction a form of preference compartmentalization—or a way of managing the cognitive 
contradiction between simultaneously being a patriot despite one’s own sense of patriotism—
rather than falsification. 
Hence, it is possible to make sense of why Russians might find cheese to be more 
important than Crimea. Crimea may be claimed by Russia and inhabited by Russians, but 
ultimately changing the motherland’s borders changes nothing about one’s relationship towards 
it. Truly patriotic Russians will accept the motherland as it is, and focus their energies on private 
duties and obligations like doing their jobs, feeding their families, and staying out of politics. 
Crimea may come and go (or, rather, the reverse), but cheese is truly patriotic. 
 
  
                                                            
67 Timur Kuran, “Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989,” 
World Politics 44, no. 1 (October 1, 1991): 7–48, doi:10.2307/2010422; Henry E. Hale, “Regime Change 
Cascades: What We Have Learned from the 1848 Revolutions to the 2011 Arab Uprisings,” Annual Review 
of Political Science 16, no. 1 (2013): 331–53, doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-032211-212204. 
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FIGURE 1: Survey on Znak.com (August 7, 2014) 
 
 
 
TABLE 1: Interview Respondents 
 
 Arts Business Education Media 
Non-
Profit Politics 
State 
Employee Student Unemployed TOTAL 
18-22 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 3 0 6 
23-29 0 6 10 0 0 3 0 0 0 19 
30-39 0 3 5 1 1 4 3 0 1 18 
40-49 1 1 2 0 1 2 1 0 1 9 
50-59 0 0 4 1 2 0 5 0 0 12 
60+ 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
TOTAL 2 11 23 2 5 10 9 3 2 67 
 
 
TABLE 2: Everyday Practices in Russia (Total Coding References)  
 
TOP-DOWN 
 
BOTTOM-UP 
Activating (187) 
Symbolizing (63) 
Performing (59) 
Supporting (50) 
Opposing (33) 
Organizing (27) 
Defending (26) 
Providing (11)  
 
Loving (118) 
Comparing (115) 
Living (102) 
Ethnicizing (62) 
Improving (49) 
Choosing (34) 
Consuming (24)  
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TABLE 3: “What Does It Mean to Be A Patriot?” (Levada Survey, 2007-2014)68 
 
 2007 2010 2013 2014 
Loving one’s 
country 
66 59 59 68 
Considering 
one’s country 
better than 
others 
18 21 21 16 
Considering that 
your country has 
no faults 
4 6 6 5 
Defending your 
country from any 
attack and 
accusation 
21 22 21 18 
Speaking the 
truth about your 
country 
10 13 11 11 
Working/acting 
for the benefit of 
your country 
27 27 21 27 
Striving to 
change your 
country for the 
better 
21 22 21 22 
Non-response 6 9 6 4 
 
 
 
TABLE 4: Everyday Patriotism and Regime Orientation  
 
 Authentic Inauthentic 
Regime ambivalence Loving 
Comparing 
Living 
Choosing 
Improving 
 
 
Regime support  Activating 
Performing 
 
                                                            
68 Analiticheskii Tsentr Iurii Levady, Obshchestvennoe Mnenie - 2014 [Public Opinion - 2014], 35. 
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